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Western Rift Over Germany Shows Need for UN Action

With a UN military victory in Korea apparently assured, the series of meetings held at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York during the week beginning September 12—first by the Big Three foreign ministers, then by the foreign ministers of the 12 North Atlantic pact nations—brought the announcement than an act of aggression against the West German state would be regarded as an attack on the United States, Britain and France. However, an important difference of opinion emerged about the use of Western Germany's manpower and material resources in any proposed security arrangements.

In advance of what had been regarded as the most significant diplomatic gathering on European affairs since 1945—a gathering whose success hinged on a free exchange of views by the participating nations—American officials had set forth the position of the United States* in a way which seemed to preclude real discussion. At the Big Three conference Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented a "single-package" program which combined President Truman's pledge of September 9 to send "substantial" American reinforcements to Europe with the requirement that German units should be organized as rapidly as possible and fitted into a European army under a single command. This apparently unexpected approach to one of the most crucial issues in Europe—the future position of Germany—startled British Foreign Sercetary Ernest Bevin and French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who found it necessary to ask their governments for instructions although they had just arrived from their respective capitals. In the meantime Mr. Acheson expounded the same program at the North Atlantic pact conference. Canada, Italy and the Netherlands supported the American view, while Britain and France maintained their previously stated positions.

When are German Forces Safe?

The fundamental divergence between Washington on the one hand and London and Paris on the other is not whether Western German potential should be utilized in a European defense effort but how and when it should be put to use. Britain, and France even more, welcomed the news that the United States would send reinforcements to Europe — one American spokesman mentioned ten divisions—and were relieved to learn that General George C. Marshall, whose interest in the European continent had been demonstrated by the Marshall plan, would become Secretary of Defense.

The two principal Western European nations, however, do not think it wise either to create German military units or to start production of armaments in German factories until they themselves acquire sufficient military strength so that they could resist any attempt by Germany to resume an expansionist policy. Americans who have not experienced the horrors of German bombings or of outright German conquest are not always sympathetic to Europe's anxiety about the ultimate intentions of the Germans, who, in the opinion of their long-suffering neighbors, may not have reformed as much as some of us have hoped. The Western European nations are also more aware than the United States of the legitimate fears Russia and Eastern Europeans may have about the resurgence of a militarized German state. Western European countries therefore dread the possibility that any move to form German military units—as distinct from an armed police force comparable to the *Bereitschaften* in Eastern Germany—may bring about the very aggression by Russia they are now being urged by Washington to avert.

From the American point of view the principal objective now is the creation and arming of as large a military force in Western Europe as possible. Since the United States must contemplate the possibility of fighting on two fronts, across two oceans, it cannot concentrate all its military resources in Europe. The Western European nations, for their part, contend that in their still precarious economic condition they cannot divert much more of their limited manpower to military service without jeopardizing their living standards and thereby creating conditions conducive to internal tension and strife which would redound to Russia's benefit. Under these circumstances Western Germany in Washington's view offers the only ready reservoir of additional manpower and war material—although the Germans themselves have so far shown a marked reluctance to consider remilitarization. The tragic irony of seeking the return of the Germans to the international community in the military role

*See Blair Bolles, *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, September 15, 1950.

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for which they were denounced in two world wars has been more widely noted in Germany and on the continent generally than in the United States.

The Psychological Problem

The problem that needs to be resolved between the United States and its Western European partners is not solely military or economic: it is also psychological. Britain and France have at least as good a picture of the perils of the current period as the United States, and in case of a general war they would again be in the front line of attack. They are willing to take risks, but since they lack the natural resources and the fortunate geographic position of the United States, they are more inclined than Americans to cut their coat according to their cloth. Moreover, having a much longer experience than the United States in dealing with Russia, both Tsarist and Communist, they are less given than this country to sharp oscillations of attitude toward Moscow.

In negotiating with Western European nations about the future of Germany, the United States faces a major test of its ability to win its objectives by diplomacy, as distinguished from military or financial means. A comparable test will face Washington in projected negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan which would provide for rearmament of the Japanese and maintenance of American military "facilities" on Japanese soil. Until now, in spite of an inherent desire to cooperate with other nations on a basis of equality, Americans have frequently acted as if international negotiations were a simple business transaction, using a "take-it-or-leave-it" tone which is not well designed to win lasting support.

Washington is justified in asserting that it has no imperialistic aims, if by imperialism is meant territorial expansion. The greater the power of the United States, however, the stronger will be the temptation to notify other countries that they must accept the course we set or else suffer the consequences of opposing us. The only way in which this temptation can be minimized is to present our policies for scrutiny and debate not merely in gatherings of three, or twelve, nations which depend on us for military and economic aid, but in the world forum of the United Nations, to which we did not hesitate to resort in the case of Korea. There were cogent reasons for not thrusting on the United Nations at the outset problems of peace-making with the enemies of World War II. But if these former enemies are now to be not only offered, but actually urged, to seize the opportunity to rearm, this is no longer a problem for the United States alone or for United States relations with Western Europe. It is a world problem, which calls even more urgently for United Nations consideration than such issues as Formosa or Eritrea.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

Marshall's Appointment Augurs Policy Harmony

WASHINGTON—The United States has seldom needed a military secretary with a knowledge of contemporary international political affairs as urgently as it does today. For that reason President Truman's nomination on September 12 of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense, in place of Louis Johnson, will strike many persons as wise, in spite of the hostility which the selection aroused at the Capitol, where 21 Senators and 105 Representatives voted on September 15 against the legislation necessary to allow a military man to take this civilian post.

As Secretary of State from 1947 to 1949, General Marshall inaugurated many of the chief features of contemporary United States foreign policy, notably the European Recovery Program and the North Atlantic pact—the latter being signed after his retirement. General Marshall also developed the policy of emphasizing our interests in Europe and minimizing those in Asia, which his successor in the State Department, Dean Acheson, followed until war broke out in Korea this summer. "Rich and powerful as we are, we cannot afford to disperse our efforts to a degree which would render all ineffective," Secretary of State Marshall said in an address at the University of California on March 19, 1948. "Every region has its claims and its proponents, and it is therefore necessary to decide on a general strategy to be employed, having in mind the entire world situation." During the past year military men have advocated a more active policy for the United States in Asia. The prospect of an eventual United Nations victory in Korea calls for redefinition of "general strategy" by the Departments of State and Defense working together in harmony.

Diplomats' Military Policy

The tendency of the State Department to rely on military strength in attempting to achieve its foreign policy objectives makes the Defense Department an indispensable factor in the formation of policy, but the inability of ex-Defense Secretary Johnson to develop a good working relationship with the State Department has led to a dangerous absence of rapport between military and foreign policy. Under these circumstances the United States has been offering its friends abroad military help which it cannot actually provide for many months. For example, when President Truman disclosed on September 9 that he had approved the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for "substantial increases" in the strength of American forces in Western Europe, the country lacked the military personnel to carry out the proposal.

In June, at the outbreak of the Korean war, the Army consisted of ten divisions. The reserves and conscripts taken into the force and the activation of National Guard units during the past two months have not greatly increased the number of men in uniform. The President's proposal of September 1 for increasing the 1.5 million in the armed forces in June to 3 million will scarcely be realized before late 1951. The forces required in Korea, in occupied areas and in the Western Hemisphere leave few available for assignment elsewhere. General Marshall can help President Truman and Secretary Acheson decide whether it is discreet for the United States to inspire overconfidence in its allies by promises of aid in advance of our ability to give it.

While the end of the Korean war would probably make possible the dispatch to Europe of troops now engaged there, the military establishment must take into account the possibility that victory in Korea would dry up American interest in the expansion of the armed forces. In March 1948 President Truman and General Marshall both urged Congress to put the United States in a "military posture" because, as General Marshall said, "we must show conclusively by decisive legislative action to all the nations of the world that

the United States intends to be strong and to hold that strength ready to keep the European world both at peace and free" and because "diplomatic action, without the backing of military strength, in the present world can lead only to appeasement."

While Congress, under the spur of the Czechoslovak coup, responded to the Truman-Marshall appeals by re-enacting the draft, nevertheless in the first months of 1950 the armed forces had less than their authorized strength. Aroused by the Korean crisis, Congress is passing an appropriation bill (already approved in slightly different versions by both House and Senate) to provide us once more with that "military posture" which the White House and State Department sought over two years ago. The bill adds $11,736,094,000 to the appropriation for the military establishment in the current fiscal year. Congress earlier had appropriated $13 billion for the armed forces. The bill will finance not only enlargement of the personnel of the Army, Navy and Air Force, but it will also enable the armed forces to purchase new material in large quantities. The $13 billion appropriation included $636 million for Army ordnance. The new appropriation adds $1,438,221,000 to that sum. The Army will be better armed than it has been since World War II.

What Next in Korea?

The change in the Defense Department coincided with the arrival of good news from Korea, where United Nations forces on September 14 made amphibious landings at Inchon, the Yellow Sea port which serves the capital city of Seoul, far behind the lines of the North Korean forces. The full success of this undertaking might presage the defeat of the North Koreans (although months of fighting may lie ahead) and, ironically, eliminate the underlying cause of the retirement of Defense Secretary Johnson — indignation over America's lack of preparedness to cope with the kind of military problem presented in Korea last June.

Victory will also force the Truman Administration to decide three political problems which are related to our military capacity. The first is whether the United Nations forces should pursue the North Koreans beyond the 38th Parallel, which before the war was the boundary between the two Korean republics, and take control of the North Korean territory, which borders on the Soviet Union. The second is whether the United Nations, which relies mainly on American forces, should occupy Korea militarily. The third is whether the United States should develop a strong military policy in Asia. The decision on each of these three questions will affect the work of Secretary of Defense Marshall, whose record suggests that he will not support those military men who, in the previous Defense administration, urged a "big-stick" policy in Asia and the launching of a "preventive" war against the Soviet Union. "War is not the choice of those who wish passionately for peace," he wrote in his final report as Chief of Staff in 1945. "It is the choice of those who are willing to resort to violence for political advantage."

BLAIR BOLLES

Will Smuts' Death Produce Political Realignment?

The death on September 11 of General Jan Christiaan Smuts, following the sweeping success of Dr. Daniel F. Malan in the South-West Africa election on September 1, focuses attention on persistent rumors that some realignment of parties will sooner or later take place in the politics-ridden Union of South Africa. So far there has been more talk than action. In the early months of 1950, however, South Africans of all groups were very willing to express, in private, their concern about the marked deterioration in race relations, the persistent suspicion of European for European and the uncertain future of existing party affiliations should time or some untoward incident remove aging political leaders.

Underlying Agreement

To an outside observer the striking thing about the private comments of Europeans in the Union is their similarity, despite the avowed association of different speakers with rigidly opposed political groups. On some of the major issues of South African life today there is more agreement among English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking Europeans than one would suspect from listening to public statements of policy or from reading editorials or other comment in either the English or the Afrikaans press.

On the all-important issue of native policy, for example—excluding the small minority (English-speaking as well as Afrikaans-speaking) who stand for a deliberate policy of racial repression and the so-called (mainly English) "liberals" who preach some form of equality—most Europeans seem in broad agreement about objectives, although they may differ a good deal about tactics. Many a Nationalist privately admitted uncertainty as to how far the Malan government's policy of *apartheid* (segregation) could be carried into practice; and most United party supporters of General Smuts agreed that some form of segregation is what they and the majority of Europeans in South Africa want. Some leading United party members even go so far as to suggest that the electoral success of the *apartheid* slogan was due partly to the fact that the Nationalists were, indeed, "feeling their way towards" a positive program on the native question, which sooner or later all Europeans must work out and apply, or else give up the idea of white supremacy in South Africa.

All this emerges from private discussion. The lines of public controversy are much more rigidly drawn, obscuring the marked degree of individual agreement that impresses the outside observer. There is thus a certain unreality about political life in the Union today. With this also goes a grim struggle to retain or to gain office rather than to advance clear political principles. Such contentious questions as the abolition of the franchise for the Cape Colored population (mainly half-caste) and assisted immigration from Britain appear to be considered much less from the point of view of principle than from that of their effect on the electoral prospects of either party. But artificial prominence is still given in the Union to racial, cultural and religious differences which elsewhere in the world have largely been replaced by sharp economic conflicts. The visitor to South Africa is struck by the intensity of feeling over such matters as the introduction of single-medium (Afrikaans-speaking or English-speaking) schools in the Transvaal, the alleged views of the Dutch Reformed Church on "Christian National Education" and the strength and multiplicity of organizations concerned with fostering Afrikaner or English (as distinct from South African) culture.

At this point one important qualification should be introduced. Contrary to a view widely accepted outside South Africa that there is a persistently bad personal relationship between Englishmen and Afrikaners in the everyday life of the Union, the writer found substantial cordiality between English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking Europeans in South Africa. Englishmen who are strongly critical of Nationalist policy or of some declared Afrikaner objectives go out of their way to impress on visitors how much they respect the Afrikaner as an individual—but always outside of politics.

Where political conflict does express itself in bitter personal relationships, it is between Afrikaner and Afrikaner, between the supporters and the opponents of the Malan government among the Afrikaans-speaking people of the Union, between those Afrikaners who opposed and those who favored South Africa's intervention in World Wars I and II, between those who see in the Malan government's program the triumph of Afrikaner culture and those who fear it as introducing a racial, authoritarian, potentially Nazi state. This widespread bitterness is perhaps most noticeable in the Orange Free State. It is the feeling almost of brother against brother. Nor is it solely concerned with the memories of the dead past. It is also bound up with struggles for place in the educational and business worlds, in the professions no less than in politics. It is certainly one of the most disquieting impressions an observer carries away from South Africa.

Causes of Conflict

Indicative of the extent to which politics rather than economics still dominates the life of the Union is the fact that the controversies of the South African (Boer) War of 1899-1902 remain very much alive today, despite the lapse of half a century. The very language of the country is steeped in those controversies. For example, the term "concentration camp" has one meaning today for Americans, Europeans and Australians and another for South Africans, for whom it revives memories of the sufferings and deaths of Boer wives and children as a result of the diseases which spread through the camps into which the British herded Boer civilians whose farms had been destroyed during the war.

The persistence of these strongly emotional nineteenth-century rivalries, reinforced by the natural resistance of the vested organizational interests of established political parties, retards what before the South-West Africa elections seemed a natural drawing together of the more moderate elements in Dr. Malan's Nationalist and Nicholaas C. Havenga's Afrikaner parties on the one hand and, on the other, those English and Afrikaner supporters of the late General Smuts who do not share the racial and other views of the small "liberal" minority in the United party. The greatly improved position of Dr. Malan's Nationalist party in the Union Parliament as a result of its South-West Africa success will doubtless make the Nationalists much less disposed to consider concessions to right-wing United party members weakened by the death of General Smuts. On the other hand, the tendency toward the formation of a strong middle party is encouraged by important economic trends in South Africa, and amalgamation may at any time be precipitated by the rapid deterioration of relations between Europeans and non-Europeans, which will be discussed in the subsequent articles of this series.

FRED ALEXANDER

(This is the first of three articles by Prof. Fred Alexander, head of the History Department at the University of Western Australia, who recently spent several months in the Union of South Africa.)

Branch and Affiliate Meetings

BOSTON, September 26, *Report From Korea,* Arthur B. Emmons II

ALBANY, September 28, *France and Germany in a United Europe,* André Philip

NEW YORK, September 28, *A Plea for a More Positive Policy,* James P. Warburg

POUGHKEEPSIE, October 2, *German-French Relations,* André Philip

LYNN, October 2, *The Future of Germany and American Foreign Policy,* Hajo Holborn

WORCESTER, October 3, *France and the Unity of Europe,* André Philip

PROVIDENCE, October 4, *European Union,* André Philip

EASTON, October 5, *European Union,* André Philip

News in the Making

MORE POWER FOR UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: To overcome the weakness of the Security Council resulting from the unanimity requirement, the United States is proposing that the powers of the General Assembly be augmented so as to make it the mainstay of world security. Means to achieve this end might include provision for summoning the Assembly on 24-hour notice, for a world police force modeled on the Korean precedent, and for UN stand-by teams to make prompt impartial investigations of trouble-spots.

BRITISH STEEL: The Labor government's decision to go forward with the nationalization of the iron and steel industry is precipitating a political showdown which may lead to a new general election. Minister of Supply George R. Strauss announced in the House of Commons on September 14 that nationalization legislation passed last year would be implemented soon after next January 1. Conservative leader Winston Churchill immediately proposed a motion of censure which, after debate on September 19, will test Labor's slim seven-vote majority.

TOWARD CONTROL OF RAW MATERIALS: The first order of the National Production Authority, headed by William H. Harrison, curbing commercial stockpiling of 32 important war materials after September 18 is designed to limit manufacturers to a "practicable minimum working inventory" and will not directly affect consumers. A week previously, on September 10, French Premier René Pleven urged international control of raw material prices to check inflation.

TORQUAY TRADE CONFERENCE: The nations which signed the general accord on tariffs and trade negotiated in October 1947 will gather in Torquay, England, on September 28. The original purpose of the conference was to be the promotion of the unhindered flow of commodities throughout the world. As a result of the Korean war and increased defense needs the French delegation is expected to press for the creation of a preferential trading area including the North Atlantic nations.

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